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12.1 Introduction
In a number of lower income and transitional economies it is common
for there to be signiﬁcant delays at the border when achieving customs
clearance. This can be due to complex customs formalities, which some-
times are continually changing, capacity constraints given limited facili-
ties, and/or corruption at the border. In some African economies, there are
reported delays of three–six months to achieve customs clearance,1 al-
though this is perhaps extreme.
Our paper begins with the observation that if such delays are signiﬁcant
and the length of the delay is endogenously determined, then trade liberal-
ization through tariﬀ reductions that increase the length of the queue can
be welfare worsening. Tariﬀreductions, as have occurred in recent years in
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), thus appear to be bad
policy without ﬁrst addressing customs clearance issues. We show this for
small open-economy cases in a simple general equilibrium model where
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Edgar Cudmore and John Whalleythere is a physical constraint on the volume of imports that can be admit-
ted. We then analyze extensions where corruption occurs and, ﬁnally,
where some imports are perishable. We apply our analysis to data on Rus-
sian trade for the late 1990s, with the results emphasizing the themes that
not only is it best to deal with border and administrative delays ﬁrst before
engaging in trade liberalization but also that the quantitative orders of
magnitudes for the costs involved can be large.
12.2 A Model of Trade with Border Delays
The role and signiﬁcance of border delays for trade liberalization in a
number of economies around the world is reﬂected in anecdotal evidence
as to their importance for the trade of Russia and other former Soviet
Union countries. Hare (2001, 484), in a recent piece on trade policy in CIS
transition economies, says “It is often asserted that inadequate physical in-
frastructure—roads, railways, and the like—inhibits trade, though solid
evidence for this is lacking. More often, the real barrier to trade is again in-
stitutional, taking the form of unreasonable customs delays at many bor-
ders in the transition economy region, accompanied by widespread de-
mands for bribes to expedite the movement of goods.”
The precise length of these delays and even how precisely they arise is
unfortunately poorly documented in the literature, but their impact on
trade is unquestionable. There is some suggestion in the literature that
continual changes in customs legislation and uncertainty as to how they
are to be implemented is a key factor. Equally, these delays are also
thought to reﬂect the time taken for negotiations between oﬃcials and
importers over valuation, which it is thought can fall dramatically
through the use of negotiation intermediaries. Bribes seem to be involved
in this process. These and other issues in the Russian case are discussed in
Beilock (2002) and Wolf and Gurgen (2000). Delays in the range of weeks
or months for clearance are often claimed in anecdotes, with six weeks be-
ing an approximate mean ﬁgure suggested to us for Russia in conversa-
tions, although this varies substantially with the port of entry and trans-
portation mode.
12.2.1 A Simple Model
The purpose of our paper is to focus on the interactions between border
delays and trade liberalization in light of their seeming importance in these
cases. We formalize these interactions in a model of a simple pure exchange
economy, which is small, and a taker of prices on world markets and en-
gaged in trade. For expositional simplicity of structure, we assume for now
there is no production and all goods are traded (these features can be
changed in numerical application). The world prices for the N goods we
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w. Tariﬀ rates ti apply to imports (ti   0 for exports),
and we assume the direction of trade is predetermined.2
In this economy, domestic prices depart from world prices on the import
side both due to tariﬀs and per-unit queuing costs at the border Tq( ). For
simplicity, we assume these costs are the same for all goods and that units
for goods are denominated in comparable physical terms (e.g., tons). Thus,
if M goods are imported and (N – M) exported and the direction of trade
is unchanged,
(1)  i
d    i
w(1   ti)   Tq( )( i   1 ...   M).
Tq is assumed to be indexed and so is homogeneous of degree one in   and
is endogenously determined.
The economy has market demand functions, ξi( d, R, Q), and nonneg-
ative endowments, wi, for each of the N goods, where  d denotes the N-
dimensional vector of domestic commodity prices. R deﬁnes tariﬀ rev-
enues, and Q represents the aggregate endogenously determined queuing
costs (denominated in units of the good being imported). These demand
functions are nonnegative, continuous, homogeneous of degree zero in  d





d[ξi( d, R, Q)   wi]   0.
Assuming there is a single representative consumer in this economy,









dwi   R  ∑
M
i 1
Tq( )(ξi   wi).
For simplicity, border delays are assumed to reﬂect a constraint on the
volume of imports that can be processed over the period of time covered by
the model (e.g., one year). Thus, for now, we consider this to be a physical
constraint rather than one reﬂecting corruption or other considerations. If





[ξi( d, R, Q)   wi]   C  ,
where R denotes tariﬀ revenues ∑M
i 1    i
wt(ξi – wi)i, and Q   ∑M
i 1  Tq( )(ξi
– wi) denotes the total queuing costs.
In this simple model, if the capacity constraint on imports is binding
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2. This is a standard assumption in most theoretical trade models, although numerically the
direction of trade can change when trade policies change. See Abrego, Riezman, and Whal-
ley (2001) for a recent discussion of the likelihood of this assumption being false in compar-
isons between free trade, customs unions, and Nash equilibria.then per-unit queuing costs Tq( w) are determined in equilibrium along
with domestic prices  d, tariﬀ revenues, and domestic demands ξi. The
eﬀect of tariﬀ liberalization will be to lower tariﬀ revenues and increase
queuing costs. In the case where tariﬀ rates are uniform across commodi-
ties, tariﬀ reductions simply generate a corresponding increase in queuing
costs. Because the latter use real resources, tariﬀ reducing trade liberaliza-
tion will typically be welfare worsening.
12.2.2 Model Extensions
This simple model can be extended in a number of ways that capture ad-
ditional mechanisms through which border delays and trade liberalization
can interact.
Corruption
One is the presence of corruption. This can be modeled simply in this
framework as the ability of customs oﬃcials to extract a bribe for allowing
passage of goods. We assume that there is a bound to the bribe, which for
simplicity we take to be the ability of an oﬃcial to send the importer to the
back of the line in the event a bribe is not paid. If we assume that oﬃcials
can only do this once, as otherwise they would reveal themselves as corrupt
oﬃcials if they repeat the denial of clearance, this means that the bribe that
can be extracted by the oﬃcial is within epsilon of the queuing costs Tq. For
simplicity, we take the bribe paid to equal Tq, which will now change rela-
tive to the no-corruption case.
The preceding discussion suggests that the queuing costs in the particu-
lar formulation outlined previously are halved, with bribes making up the
remaining diﬀerence between world and domestic prices for imports. Thus,
if B represents the bribe paid per-unit import
(5)  i
d     i
w(1   ti)   Tq   B
and by construction B   Tq.
This also means that in equation (4) the real resource loss from queuing
is halved and exports increase, as fewer export earnings are needed to cover
queuing costs. Corruption in this case is thus socially desirable as real re-
source costs are now partially replaced by a transfer of income to govern-
ment oﬃcials.
Perishability
A further elaboration on the basic model can be used to show how diﬀ-
erential impacts of queuing on diﬀerent commodities can result. One way
this can happen is if perishable commodities are more adversely aﬀected
by queuing than nonperishable commodities. Diﬀerential impacts of bor-
der delays across commodities are the end result with added distortionary
costs.
394 Edgar Cudmore and John WhalleyWe can capture this by deﬁning a variable  i, which represents the frac-
tion of goods shipped that actually arrive, where  i   1, and (1 –  i) is the
perish rate for good i.3 We can then make  i a function of the time spent
queuing so as to capture the feature that perish rates increase with queuing
time.
Thus, for each unit shipped and paid for, only  i units actually arrive; or,
(6)  i






i)   Tq
 
and
(7)  i   1    Tq,
where   is a constant, and so perish rates increase with queuing time.
With this formulation, diﬀerential impacts of queuing by commodity re-
sult and even uniform tariﬀ liberalization now has diﬀerential impacts by
good.
Other Extensions
Various other extensions to this basic model can also be made, which for
space reasons we do not elaborate on in any detail. We can use a model with
production rather than a simple pure exchange economy with endow-
ments. We can also incorporate nontraded as well as traded goods. Both of
these are standard in numerical general equilibrium models of actual econ-
omies (see Shoven and Whalley 1992), although neither changes the basic
analytical structure in which queuing costs are endogenously determined.
We can also modify the model set out previously for cases in which
diﬀerent commodities incur diﬀerent queuing costs per unit weight due to
diﬀering administrative procedures. This could arise with valuation proce-
dures being more complex for, say, components for electronic products
compared to basic commodities such as coal. This can be done by building
in diﬀerent factors of proportionality into the analysis for queuing costs for
the various quantities imported. Again, the essential structure of the model
remains unchanged.
12.3 Some Calculations Using Russian Data
Using this simple framework, we have made some calculations using
Russian data to explore the possible quantitative orders of magnitude in-
volved with analysis of trade liberalization that incorporate border delays.
The delays reported in the Russian case appear to be lengthy and a major
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3. Implicitly, the assumption here is that customs clearance only occurs for the nonperished
goods (perished goods are disposed of before customs clearance occurs). Alternative formu-
lation under which all goods are cleared for customs and only the nonperished portion is sold
could also be used.restraint on trade. These calculations thus serve to underline the point that
if tariﬀ reforms occur with no attention being paid ﬁrst to administrative
considerations and border delays, liberalization can be welfare worsening
rather than welfare improving as is usually the case in conventional mod-
els rather than providing accurate point estimates of actual impacts. Im-
portantly, they suggest that there are costs rather than beneﬁts from trade
liberalization in such cases, and they can be substantial.
To apply the model set out previously to the Russian case, we use con-
stant elasticity of substitution (CES) demand functions and, in addition,
specify the model so as to also include both a non-traded goods sector and
two traded goods so that distortions between perishable and nonperishable
imports can be analyzed. All model variants thus include four goods (an
exportable, two importables, and a nontraded good).
We use the standard applied general equilibrium modeling approach of
calibration to a base-case data set, followed by counterfactual equilibrium
analysis (see Shoven and Whalley 1992). To make our calculations of the
impacts of trade liberalization incorporating border delays, we have con-
structed a benchmark equilibrium data set for Russian trade, consump-
tion, and endowments (taken to equal production) by averaging data for
1997, 1998, and 1999.4 These are years during which there was substantial
variation in Russian trade performance due to the 1998 ﬁnancial crisis, and
using averages in this way partially mitigates extremes in any one year’s
data. We use tariﬀdata from World Bank sources for 1999,5which suggests
an approximate average tariﬀ rate across all imports of 10 percent. We as-
sume an average border delay of three weeks in customs clearance (six
weeks is the ﬁgure often claimed). This is the basis for an approximate es-
timate that with nondelay shipping times from Western Europe of three
days and formal transportation cost in the range of 5 percent (see Hum-
mels [1999] for a recent discussion of the size of transportation costs in
trade), delay costs could be in the range of 30 percent of the value of im-
ports. We use this estimate as the base-case value in our computations,
making some modiﬁcations in the perishability case.
We use calibration methods and this data to determine both share and
elasticity parameters in preferences. For the case of CES preferences, de-
mands are given by
(8) Xi   (i   1 ...   N),
 iI




j 1 j( j
d)1  
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4. Data on trade and consumption are taken from the 2001 World Development Indicators.
Data on production by industry (which we use to represent endowments) originates from
Goskomstat sources, and we are thankful to Natalia Tourdyeva for providing it for us.
5. Data on tariﬀ rates are taken from the 2001 World Development Indicators, published by
the World Bank.where  i are CES shares,   is the substitution elasticity, and income, I, is
given by







Tq(   i
w)(ξi   wi).
In this case, the import demand elasticity,  i
m, for import good i is given
by
(10)  i




  (i   1 ...   N),
where Si is the income expenditure share on good i.
These elasticities are not constant and so direct calibration is not pos-
sible. The convention in calibration literature is to use a literature estimate
and choose   so that the implied point estimate of the elasticity in the
neighborhood of the benchmark equilibrium is literature consistent. If
share parameters on imported goods are large, then negative values of  
can result from calibration if import demand elasticities in the neighbor-
hood of one are used. This is common in general equilibrium trade mod-
els, as the majority of estimates in the literature are around one (see Erkel-
Rousse and Mirza 2002). Not recognizing the signiﬁcance of nontraded
goods can result in this problem as expenditure shares on traded goods are
smaller in models with nontraded goods than without them, and this is one
reason for including them in the model.
Using GAMS (1996) solution software, we calibrate both the basic
model and associated variants to the averaged 1997–1999 benchmark data
set. We then evaluate the eﬀects of tariﬀ reform for each model variant by
computing counterfactual equilibria that we also compare to the base case.
We also use a model variant where no border delays are present, which we
term the conventional case. In this event, gains from tariﬀ liberalization
occur.
We classify the trade data into importables and exportables based on the
sign of net trade ﬂows by commodity. We use equation (8) to calibrate
model share parameters from data on consumption and prices, choosing
units for goods in the model such that world prices are one. Equation (8) is
used jointly in calibration with equation (9), which determines   given
shares, once import price elasticity values are assumed.6 Our calibrations
yield share and elasticity parameter estimates for the basic model variants
for assumed values of import price elasticities lying between –1 and –2 (one
is the most frequently used in empirical trade models) as set out in table
12.1.
Using models parameterized in this way, we have generated two sets of
results that allow us to analyze the interactions between trade liberaliza-
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6. We calibrate to the import price elasticity of the ﬁrst import good, and, as share param-
eters on the two imports are similar, these two import price elasticities are very close.tion and border delays. In table 12.2, we show welfare and trade impacts of
liberalization in the basic model with border delays and in two model ex-
tensions that incorporate corruption and perishability. These estimates are
reported for the three values of assumed import price elasticities used in
calibration in table 12.1.
Results in table 12.2 show negative welfare eﬀects of trade liberalization
measured in terms of the Hicksian equivalent variation as a percentage of
income in all cases. These costs become larger as the assumed price elas-
ticity rises as both substitution elasticities and share parameters change
the evaluation of utility pre- and postliberalization changes. Larger im-
pacts on queuing costs across these cases reﬂect the diﬀerent share param-
eters generated by calibration. Costs are smaller in the with-corruption
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Table 12.1 Calibrated basic model parameters from 1997–1999 Russian data
Share parameters in preferences
Assumed import    generated by  Nontraded 
price elasticity calibration Imported goods Exportables goods
–1.0 0.314 0.260 0.220 0.068 0.452
–1.5 0.676 0.276 0.234 0.064 0.426
–2.0 1.038 0.293 0.248 0.060 0.399
Table 12.2 Impacts of trade liberalization in Russia in the presence of border delays: Models
calibrated to averaged 1997–1999 data
Basic model with  Extended model  Extended model 
border delays with corruption with perishability
A. Import price elasticity   –1
Welfare gain/loss as Hicksian EV as %  –0.130 –0.146 –0.134
of income
Impacts on import volumes (% change) 0 0 –0.078 (perishable)
0.017 (nonperishable)
Impacts on export volumes (% change) 0.711 0.920 0.723
B. Import price elasticity   –1.5
Welfare gain/loss as Hicksian EV as %  –0.248 –0.245 –0.253
of income
Impacts on import volumes (% change) 0 0 –0.431 (perishable)
0.095 (nonperishable)
Impacts on export volumes (% change) 1.361 1.550 1.369
C. Import price elasticity   –2
Welfare gain/loss as Hicksian EV as %  –0.343 –0.310 –0.347
of income
Impacts on import volumes (% change) 0 0 –0.989 (perishable)
0.217 (nonperishable)
Impacts on export volumes (% change) 1.887 1.969 1.883cases, for high elasticities and larger for smaller elasticities. The real re-
source costs from queuing in corruption cases are approximately one-half
of those in no-corruption cases, and in that sense corruption is good in the
model. But changes in queuing costs are comparable. Perishability raises
costs slightly for all import price elasticity cases. Import volumes only
change in the perishability cases. Here, because tariﬀreductions raise queu-
ing costs and these increase proportionally more for perishable goods, im-
ports of perishable goods fall and imports of nonperishable goods rise.
The second set of results in table 12.3 compares those from the basic
model with border delays to those from a more conventional model with no
border delays. To make this comparison, we use a case for a conventional
tariﬀ model where there are no queuing costs in the base case so that in this
model relative price eﬀects of tariﬀ liberalization come into play as tariﬀs
are eliminated and no queuing costs enter. In the comparable border delay
model, the capacity constraint on imports remains. A tariﬀ equal to the
combined queuing plus tariﬀ wedge in the base model is applied to the con-
ventional model. We then consider a reduction in this tariﬀ by 10 percent-
age points. In both of these cases, we use an import price elasticity of minus
one in calibration. As table 12.3 indicates, the signs of welfare eﬀects are re-
versed between models, and the absolute values of eﬀects are diﬀerent.
These simulation results thus clearly show how trade liberalization can
be welfare worsening in the presence of border delays. Tariﬀ reductions
have little or no impact on domestic prices because of the capacity con-
straint on processing imports. More queuing results in added real resource
costs, rather than generating revenues as is true with tariﬀs. The presence
of corruption tends to weaken these eﬀects as lowered tariﬀs now increase
transfers to corrupt oﬃcials with smaller eﬀects on aggregate incomes. Per-
ishability considerations aﬀect the costs of liberalization through more
product loss, and added queuing results. And the diﬀerences relative to a
conventional trade liberalization model are in sign.
This analysis and the simulations reported therefore point to the signiﬁ-
cant role that border delays can play in inﬂuencing the eﬀects of trade liber-
alization. Without prior attention to administrative procedures and customs
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Table 12.3 Comparing result of trade liberalization in Russia using a conventional
model and one incorporating border delays, averaged 1997–1999 data
Conventional model  Basic model with 
(no border delays) border delays
Import price elasticity   –1
Welfare gain/loss as Hicksian EV as % 
of income 0.044 –0.130
Impacts on import volumes (% change) 0.931 0
Impacts on export volumes (% change) 0.614 0.711clearance, trade liberalization can become welfare worsening by increasing
queuing costs. Trade liberalization in CIS states that does not ﬁrst deal with
administrative delays can thus be viewed as potentially counterproductive.
12.4 Directions for Future Work and Broader Policy Implications
While simple, it is worth emphasizing again that the preceding analysis
can be potentially misleading if applied mechanically to trade policy re-
form where border delays operate and that our purpose is more to raise the
issue of analytical process in the presence of border delays than to provide
a precise forecast of impact.7 In this concluding section we brieﬂy indicate
some of the diﬃculties with our simple treatment and, in the process, sug-
gest possible directions for future work. Customs procedures, preshipment
inspection, and other related issues have been part of World Trade Orga-
nizations (WTO) discussions for some time. Our analysis, in part, draws at-
tention to some of the analytical issues with these issues by implicitly ar-
guing that for trade liberalization in many countries around the world to
be eﬀective, it needs to be accompanied by administrative reforms.
There are several issues that our simple analytics raise, and more com-
plex formulations can often lead to diﬀering conclusions from the analysis.
For instance, we treat C  as a ﬁxed physical constraint, but if there is instead
a cost of processing function at the border, things can change. Liu’s papers
(1985, 1996), for instance, suggest that if the speed of processing at the bor-
der is under the control of customs oﬃcials, then more bribes may be able
to be extracted than in our treatment of corruption. On the other hand, re-
laxing the rigid C  constraint should also lower the costs of induced queu-
ing. In some cases the outcome of trade liberalization may be ambiguous
and likely depend on demand elasticities where speed is endogenous and
bribes occur. When demands are inelastic, trade liberalization may in-
crease processing costs due to longer delays by rent extracting oﬃcials, and
vice versa when demands are elastic.
The evaluation of corruption as being welfare improving in this simple
structure may also be misleading if induced corruption in the trade sector
leads to spreading corruption elsewhere in the economy. Our simple anal-
ysis assumes only that bribes substitute for tariﬀs at no economic cost. If
corruption is costly, liberalization need not be welfare worsening, and cases
where imperfect substitutes are involved will also need to be considered.
The ﬁxed production assumption in the model misses further issues. This
assumption may lead to an underestimate of the welfare gains from tariﬀ
liberalization by ignoring production side eﬀects and could equally over-
state the gains from corruption. There are also no externalities from cor-
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7. We are grateful to Francis Lui, Chong-Hyun Nam, and Andrew Rose for many of the ob-
servations and points in this section.ruption present in the analysis and, hence, wider implications for the rule
of law are not discussed.
At the end of the day, however, our analysis suggests that border delays
and customs procedures (with associated links to processes of corruption)
are perhaps more important for contemporary trade analysis than cur-
rently recognized and highlight the need to move beyond tariﬀ-based dis-
cussions in numerical work on trade liberalization impacts. The speciﬁcs of
such analyses will vary from case to case.
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Comment Francis T. Lui
Cudmore and Whalley have constructed a model that reminds us of an in-
teresting possibility in international trade. Trade liberalization, if not pre-
ceded by some institutional reforms, could result in welfare worsening. The
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Francis T. Lui is a professor of economics and director of the Center for Economic Devel-
opment at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.institutional factor being studied here is the capacity constraint on the
amount of goods that can be cleared at the customs at any period of time.
Liberalization lowers prices and increases the quantity demanded for im-
ported goods. Because of the capacity constraint, people will spend more
real resources and waiting time for customs clearance. The loss in welfare
can be partly mitigated if bribes, which are transfer payments, are used to
shorten the waiting time for some people. If the goods have diﬀerent de-
grees of perishability, a uniform reduction in tariﬀs could increase the costs
of delays diﬀerentially.
The model constructed is that of general equilibrium. This has the ad-
vantage that the calibrated results for estimating the quantitative eﬀects of
various scenarios are more reliable. However, we can easily get the main
theoretical results by simply using an extremely simple partial equilibrium
model to tell the story.
In ﬁgure 12C.1, D represents the demand curve for the traded good and
C∗ is the capacity constraint at the customs. When the price is P 1, the real
resource loss due to waiting, as is well known, is P 1ABF. If the price is P 2,
real resource loss is P 2ABE. However, when corruption is possible, people
can pay bribes to compete for the good rather than relying on waiting. The
price mechanism is partially restored, and the real resource loss is obvi-
ously reduced.
The issue of perishability is similar to the question of diﬀerential time
costs in the literature of queuing theory and bribery. When people waiting
in line have diﬀerent values of time, those who have higher values can pay
greater bribes so that they can be served sooner. This again introduces an
element of the pricing mechanism into the allocation process and improves
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Fig. 12C.1 Partial equilibrium analysis of the Cudmore-Whalley modelwelfare. Governments dealing with the problem that goods waiting at the
customs are perishable can legalize bribery. This can be done by simply cre-
ating priority queues, where the waiting time depends on whether some
fees have been paid. Trade liberalization of perishable goods should be ac-
companied by the introduction of priority queues.
The paper treats capacity constraint as exogenous. In the real world, this
is often not the case. The quantity of goods that can be processed at the cus-
toms depends very much on how fast the oﬃcers want to work. A natural
extension of the model is to ask how C∗ responds to corruption and trade
liberalization.
In Lui (1985), I show that corruption generally increases the speed of the
service provided by the oﬃcers. Without corruption, they have little in-
centive to work hard. C∗is therefore small. The high waiting costs will dis-
courage people from joining the queue. When oﬃcers can accept bribes,
they want to attract more customers. This can be done by their working
faster. C∗ therefore increases. By doing so, oﬃcers can increase the total
value of the bribes they can get.
The eﬀect of trade liberalization on C∗is ambiguous. Assume that given
any price level for a good, the capacity constraint C∗ is always chosen in
such a way that the oﬃcer can maximize the bribes he receives. The latter
can be represented by the area of P 1ABF in the ﬁgure, when the price is P 1.
Now let trade liberalization reduce the price to P 2. Will the optimal C∗ in-
crease or not? The answer generally depends on the elasticity of demand
for the good. In the case of constant price elasticity, it can easily be shown
that trade liberalization causes C∗ to fall, provided that demand is inelas-
tic. As a result, corrupt oﬃcers will slow down their service. However,
when demand for the good is elastic, liberalization will lead to a higher
value of C∗ because the oﬃcers will work faster. Thus, introducing endo-
geneity to C∗ can enrich the model’s implications.
The welfare-improving property of corruption in this model is partly due
to the static nature of the analysis. If corruption is possible, oﬃcers at the
customs are in a position to receive bribe payments. This will induce rent-
seeking activities through which people can compete for those oﬃcer po-
sitions. At equilibrium, the possible real resource saved by bribe transfers
will be completely depleted by costly rent-seeking activities aimed at ac-
quiring the oﬃcer positions. Thus, in the long run, there is no gain in wel-
fare when corruption is allowed.
To summarize, the paper is stimulating. It can be extended in many ways.
Reference
Lui, Francis T. 1985. An equilibrium queuing model of bribery. Journal of Political
Economy 93 (4): 760–81.
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This is an excellent paper, one that greatly increases our understanding of
the role of border delays and corruption in relation to trade liberalization.
The message of the paper is very clear: any trade liberalization can become
welfare worsening by increasing queuing costs. On the other hand, corrup-
tion can be welfare improving if queuing costs are replaced by income trans-
ferring bribes. The paper tries to prove these theses both by construct-
ing a model and by applying the model to the Russian data.
I think the subject of the paper is very timely indeed, since a more broad
issue of trade facilitation, which includes border delay problems, has be-
come a hot topic for negotiation in recent years both at the Asia-Paciﬁc
Economic Cooperation (APEC) and at the World Trade Organization
(WTO) levels.
Costs related to trade facilitation have long been thought an important
factor that determines transaction costs in international trade, along with
such traditional factors as tariﬀ and nontariﬀ barriers and transportation
costs. Among these factors, however, tariﬀand nontariﬀbarriers have been
losing their signiﬁcance as major impediments to trade through succes-
sive General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade/World Trade Organization
(GATT/WTO) rounds, while transportation costs have also been decreas-
ing over time due to technological innovations and increasing shipping ca-
pacities. As a result, the relative importance of trade facilitation or border
delays has become much more conspicuous and, hence, deserves greater
attention than before. This paper is focused on this issue.
I have three comments to make. The ﬁrst one is about the capacity con-
straint on imports as given in equation (4) in the paper, which is presum-
ably the main source of border delays. This capacity constraint may prove
to be too strong an assumption, I suppose. This is because, with the ca-
pacity constraint, any import liberalization amounts to replacing import
tariﬀs simply by some tariﬀ-equivalent import quotas, leaving no change
in import volumes. This capacity constraint assumption later on leads to
empirical results that import liberalization has no impact at all on import
volumes, as shown in table 12.2 in the paper. I have diﬃculty following the
logic that import liberalization can increase queuing costs while it has no
impact on import volumes.
I wonder, therefore, if there is a way either to relax the capacity con-
straint assumption or to replace the capacity constraint equation by some
queuing costs equation that is expressed as a function of import volumes.
My second comment concerns the role of corruption. As expressed in
equation (5) in the paper, a bribery variable enters into the equation where
a bribe can successfully replace or substitute queuing costs with no eco-
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Chong-Hyun Nam is a professor of economics at Korea University.nomic costs as a bribe represents an income transfer from importers to oﬃ-
cials. This leads to an automatic conclusion that corruption is welfare im-
proving.
Well, I have some sympathy with this conclusion. Corruption can be
quite eﬀective sometimes in making oﬃcials work harder and for longer
hours and thereby helps to expand the import capacity constraint or re-
duces queuing costs. We used to call such a bribe an express fee in Korea.
Oﬃcials are collecting private taxes or getting paid for their extra services
provided to the importers!
Corruption, however, can be welfare worsening, too. Above all, it is ille-
gal and, hence, causes external diseconomies to the society. Even if there is
no legality problem, it can entail social costs, as oﬃcials may sabotage their
normal work duties in order to incite importers to bribe them. To put it dif-
ferently, they may not like to move before they are getting bribed. In an ex-
treme case, if there are markets developed for corruption and they are per-
fectly competitive, importers may end up wasting real resources for bribing
as much as gains expected from the bribing, for example, by hiring expen-
sive lobbyists or ex-government oﬃcials.
My ﬁnal comment is about the assumption of ﬁxed productions in the
model, initially given as endowments so that they cannot change despite
trade liberalization. This assumption, no doubt, would have contributed to
an underestimation of welfare gains expected from trade liberalization, as
shown in table 12.3 in the paper.
On balance, there are good reasons to believe that empirical results ob-
tained in the paper represent a gross underestimation for potential welfare
gains from trade liberalization and an overestimation for welfare gains ex-
pected from corruption. I am worried that such results may provide the
wrong signals to Russian policymakers or the public that trade liberaliza-
tion is only trivially important, whereas corruption is not all that bad. Do
we need to send such a signal to Russia, which is already suﬀering from
rampant corruption?
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